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The Globalization of Corporate Tax 
Reform 
Steven A. Bank* 
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM MOVEMENT
III. THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM
IV. CONNECTING GLOBAL REFORM WITH U.S. INITIATIVES
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, corporations have been linked primarily to their respective 
home countries.1  Firms have operated abroad as long as transportation has 
permitted relatively easy travel across national boundaries,2 but the fixed 
location of tangible property tended to restrict corporate wealth and identity 
to fairly defined boundaries.3  In the early days of the U.S. income tax, when 
corporations were only offered a deduction rather than a credit for taxes paid 
to foreign governments,4 firms may have been tempted to move at least 
some operations overseas to reduce their tax burden amidst the rising rates 
of World War I, but this was soon remedied.5  Indeed, the adoption of the 
foreign tax credit in 1918 was supported as a means “to prevent revenue loss 
 *  Vice Dean and Professor, UCLA School of Law.  Portions of this essay are derived from 
Chapter 7 of Steven A. Bank, Anglo-American Corporate Taxation: Tracing the Common Roots of 
Divergent Approaches (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).  Copyright © Steven A. Bank.  2011.  
Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.  This article is part of Pepperdine
Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium, co-
sponsored by Tax Analysts. 
 1.  See STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD 261 (2010). 
 2.  See generally Ron Harris, Law, Finance, and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 145 (James J. Heckman et al. eds., 2009). 
 3.  This was particularly evident in the analogous situation of antebellum state property tax 
regimes.  See C.K. YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF 
GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860–1920, at 218 (1970). 
 4.  Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International 
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1041 (1997). 
 5.  See id. at 1044–45. 
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through incorporation of foreign subsidiaries or expatriation.”6  As the 
mobility of capital, labor, and property further increased and political 
barriers continued to decline, however, the true multinational corporation 
inevitably began to emerge. 
This development of the multinational corporation has accelerated in 
recent years due in part to an increase in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions.  A dramatic rise in cross-border activity accompanied the 
success of the U.S. stock market in the 1990s.7  Despite some fluctuation in 
the wake of the most recent economic recession, corporate globalization 
continues to grow.8  According to the Factset Mergerstat Review, the 
number of U.S. firms that acquired foreign entities increased to 1,736 in 
2007, as compared to 1,708 in 2006 and 1,107 in 1997.9  Mirroring this 
trend, U.S. firms acquired by foreign entities increased from 1,490 in 2005 
and a mere 167 in 1992 to 1,526 in 2006.10 
Even where corporations continue to be nominally located in the U.S., 
the major growth in corporate profits, although not necessarily sales, has 
occurred outside the U.S.11  From 2006 through 2011, corporate profits grew 
by approximately $219 billion, but only $36.6 billion of that was from 
domestic activities and the remaining $182 billion of growth occurred in the 
rest of the world.12  According to the Congressional Budget Office’s recently 
released report, Options for Taxing U.S. Multinational Corporations, 
approximately half of all revenues from the corporate income tax came from 
multinational corporations with income earned in foreign countries.13  
Effectively, firms have found ways to “redomicile themselves” outside of 
the formal incorporation mechanism.14 
Professor Mihir Desai of Harvard Business School, characterizing this 
globalization process as the “decentering” of the modern business 
 6.  Roswell Magill & William C. Schaab, American Taxation of Income Earned Abroad, 13 
TAX L. REV. 115, 118 (1958) (citing 56 CONG. REC. 677–78 (1918)). 
 7.  Julian di Giovanni, What Drives Capital Flows? The Case of Cross-Border M&A Activity 
and Financial Deepening, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 127, 131 (2005); see BANK, supra note 1, at 262. 
 8.  Di Giovanni, supra note 7, at 128; see BANK, supra note 1, at 262. 
 9.  FACTSET, MERGERSTAT REVIEW 2007, at 50 (2007); see BANK, supra note 1, at 262. 
 10.  FACTSET, supra note 9, at 94; see BANK, supra note 1, at 262. 
 11.  Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational Company 
Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247 (2012). 
 12. National Income and Product Accounts, Table 6.16.D, Corporate Profits by Industry, U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS,  http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid= 
9&step=3&isuri=1&910=X&911=0&903=239&904=2006&905=1000&906=A (last updated Feb. 
28, 2013). 
 13.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43764. 
 14.  Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 134, 137–38 
(2012) [hereinafter Desai, A Better Way to Tax]. 
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corporation, noted that “[t]he archetypal multinational firm with a particular 
national identity and a corporate headquarters fixed in one country is 
becoming obsolete as firms continue to maximise the opportunities created 
by global markets.  National identities can mutate with remarkable ease and 
firms are unbundling critical headquarters functions and reallocating them 
worldwide.”15  According to Desai, “[t]he defining characteristics of what 
made a firm belong to a country—where it was incorporated, where it was 
listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location of its headquarters 
functions—are no longer unified nor are they bound to one country.”16 
Partially due to this decentering of the firm, U.S. corporate tax revenues 
as a percentage of gross domestic product have declined precipitously, both 
as compared with the U.S. in the 1970s and as compared with other 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
nations.17  In fact, “[c]orporate tax receipts as a share of profits are at their 
lowest level in at least 40 years,” amounting to a mere 12.1% in fiscal year 
2011, as compared with 25.6% on average between 1987 and 2008.18  As 
these rates rise and it becomes increasingly difficult to pin down a 
corporation’s true location, firms will have greater opportunities to reap the 
benefits of international differences in the corporate tax system.19 
With the breakdown of national affiliation and its effect on corporate tax 
revenues, it is not surprising that international tax reform is a major part of 
President Obama’s Framework for Business Tax Reform as he begins his 
second term.20  Congressional leaders have already started investigating 
structural reform and the Congressional Budget Office released a report in 
January of 2013 examining legislative options for moving the U.S. scheme 
closer to either a purer worldwide system of taxing multinational 
corporations than it currently has or instead converting to a territorial 
system.21  As Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus remarked in 
support of considering structural reforms to the U.S. international tax 
 15.  Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, in THE WORLD ECONOMY 1271, 
1271–72 (2009). 
 16.  Id. at 1272. 
 17.  Desai, A Better Way to Tax, supra note 14, at 138. 
 18.  Damian Paletta, With Tax Break, Corporate Rate Is Lowest in Decades, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204662204577199492233215330.html. 
 19.  See BANK, supra note 1, at 262. 
 20.  WHITE HOUSE AND DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS 
TAX REFORM 13–15 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf. 
 21.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 1. 
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scheme, “In the past two decades, the number of U.S.-based companies on 
the Fortune Global 500 list has declined by 20 percent. . . .  When it comes 
to international tax rules, we seem to have the worst of all worlds.”22 
Part of the difficulty with legislative measures to address the corporate 
tax evasion problem, however, is that U.S. multinational corporations 
already easily sidestep them.  As Lee Sheppard of Tax Analysts explains: 
 International corporate income taxation is in crisis.  U.S. 
multinationals are paying little or no tax to any government, 
including the U.S. government. . . . 
 Yet American tax policymakers are arguing about whether to 
convert to a territorial system that stands to make all of the existing 
problems worse, ignoring the do-it-yourself territorial system that 
U.S. multinationals already enjoy.  It would be a terrible cliché to 
say that the territorial argument is tantamount to rearranging the 
deck chairs while the boat is taking on water, but it is.23 
According to economist Kimberly Clausing, multinational corporations 
avoid approximately $90 billion a year in taxes as a result of income 
shifting.24  Desai concludes that the current system is dysfunctional, noting 
that “[t]he complexity of the current system and the proliferation of tax 
avoidance techniques have made the corporate tax optional for many global 
corporations.”25 
The problem is highlighted in the case of global technology companies, 
where the primary asset and source of income is intellectual property that 
may be easily shifted to tax-friendly locations.  Many of these global 
technology companies have transferred income-producing assets such as 
intellectual property to Ireland, whose low 12.5% corporate income tax rate 
allowed it to attract major corporations and become a center of high 
technology jobs in Europe.26  At the same time, however, the ability to 
manipulate the legal definition of home, especially in light of differing 
national standards, plus lax transfer pricing rules, has led to the rise of the 
“Double Irish” or “Dutch Sandwich” scheme that helps companies avoid 
even Ireland’s low corporate tax rate.27  Reportedly used or contemplated by 
 22.  Diana Fuchtgott-Roth, Corporate Tax Reform Should Come First, 137 TAX NOTES 901, 901 
(Nov. 19, 2012) (quoting Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Fin. Comm., Keynote Address at the 
Bipartisan Policy Center Special Presentation: The Tax Piece of the Debt Puzzle (June 11, 2012)). 
 23.  Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Why Do We Need Treaties?, 137 TAX NOTES 825, 825–26 
(2012). 
 24.  Kimberly A. Clausing, A Challenging Time for International Tax Policy, 136 TAX NOTES 
281, 281 (2012). 
 25.  Desai, A Better Way to Tax, supra note 14, at 136. 
 26.  Frank Barry, Tax Policy, FDI and the Irish Economic Boom of the 1990s, 33 ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 221, 222–23 (2003). 
 27.  For a fuller description of the “Double Irish” scheme, see Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey 
Lemaster, Double Irish More Than Doubles the Tax Saving: Hybrid Structure Reduces Irish, U.S. 
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a number of American-identified companies such as Apple, Google, 
Facebook, and Microsoft, the “Double Irish” involves the creation of two 
Irish companies, one of which has its “effective centre of management” in 
Bermuda or some other tax haven jurisdiction.28  The Bermuda-based 
company pays a relatively low fee for a license to the parent company for 
the right to sublicense its intellectual property to the Irish-based subsidiary, 
which uses it in the sale of products outside the U.S.29  The Bermuda-based 
company is an Irish company for U.S. purposes, which presumably aids in 
the approval of the transfer pricing arrangement because of the presence of a 
U.S.–Ireland tax treaty, but is a Bermuda company for Irish purposes, which 
allows it to avoid Irish taxes.30  This arrangement leaves the American parent 
with little income in the U.S. because of the low transfer fee and the Irish-
based subsidiary with no net income in Ireland because the royalty payment 
cancels out its income.31  To avoid Irish withholding taxes on the payment 
from the Irish subsidiary to the Bermuda-based Irish subsidiary, the money 
is funneled through a Dutch firm that qualifies for the exemption available to 
payments to companies within the European Union.32  The result is that there 
is no revenue in Ireland and virtually all of the income is sourced to 
Bermuda, which has no corporate tax.33  The parent company is 
headquartered in the United States, the work is largely performed in Ireland, 
and Worldwide Taxation, PRACTICAL US/INT’L TAX STRATEGIES, May 15, 2007, at 2, 12–14; 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 706–13 (2011); Jesse Drucker, 
Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-
lost-to-tax-loopholes.html [hereinafter Drucker, Google]. 
 28. See Drucker, Google, supra note 27.  The recent revelation that Facebook only paid £2.9 
million in tax in Ireland on £840 million in total non-U.S. profit, and only £238,000 in tax in the 
U.K. on an estimated £175 million in total profits on ads sold in the U.K. has led to calls for 
increased enforcement efforts in the U.K.  See Rupert Neate, Facebook Paid £2.9m Tax on £840m 
Profits Made Outside U.S., Figures Show, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 23, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/dec/23/facebook-tax-profits-outside-us/print.  Similarly, 
Australian tax authorities claim that Facebook, Google, Apple, and eBay have collectively avoided 
as much as $1 billion in revenues.  Phil Jacob, Big Firms Play ‘Double Dutch’ to Skip on Tax, 
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/big-firms-play-
double-dutch-to-skip-on-tax/story-e6freuy9-1226543763777. 
 29.  J. Bryan Lowder, The Double Irish and the Dutch Sandwich: The Explainer’s Field Guide to 
Exotic Tax Dodges, SLATE (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
explainer/2011/04/the_double_irish_and_the_dutch_sandwich.html. 
 30.  Id.  While the U.S. uses legal incorporation as the standard, Ireland bases tax residency on 
where a corporation is managed and controlled.  Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 13. 
 31.  See Lowder, supra note 29. 
 32.  See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 14; Drucker, Google, supra note 27. 
 33.  See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 14; Drucker, Google, supra note 27 
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the license is owned in Bermuda by a company incorporated in Ireland, and 
the income is taxed nowhere until repatriated to the U.S.34 
Although the U.S. is not without tools to try to unilaterally target a 
transaction like the “Double Irish” or “Dutch Sandwich,”35 it demonstrates 
the multinational nature of the corporate tax evasion problem.  The scheme 
relies on the U.S.–Ireland tax treaty and the lower corporate tax rate in 
Ireland, the distinction between the incorporation-based definition of tax 
home in the U.S. and the “managed and controlled” definition in Ireland,36 
the presence of an exemption from the Irish withholding tax for royalty 
payments to a European Union (EU) member state such as the Netherlands,37 
the ability to move money from the Netherlands to Bermuda without a 
Dutch withholding tax through the use of Dutch “special financial units,”38 
and the absence of a corporate income tax in a jurisdiction like Bermuda.39  
Effectively, the ease in moving corporate assets and the malleability in the 
definition of legal home, combined with a few tax-friendly jurisdictions, 
makes it increasingly difficult for countries to unilaterally maintain the 
integrity of their separate corporate tax systems except in the case of purely 
domestic corporations.40 
Noticeably missing from Obama’s Framework for Business Tax 
Reform, from the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) report on the 
Options for Taxing U.S. Multinational Corporations, and from most 
discussion of the major structural reform proposals, is any mention of the 
influence and importance of international reform efforts.41  Although the 
concern over corporate tax evasion is especially pronounced in the U.S., this 
decentering phenomenon and its effect on corporate tax revenues is by no 
 34.  See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 14; Drucker, Google, supra note 27. 
 35.  For example, the scheme appears to rely on the U.S. having approved the transfer pricing 
agreement for the transfer of licensing rights from the U.S. corporation to the Irish holding company 
at favorable rates and it relies on the Dutch and second Irish company (which is considered a 
Bermuda company for Irish purposes) being classified as disregarded entities under the U.S. check-
the-box regulations.  Kleinbard, supra note 27, at 708, 710; see also Stephen C. Loomis, Recent 
Development, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
825, 845–52 (2012) (discussing possible solutions such as utilizing Section 482 to reallocate income, 
promulgating new anti-abuse regulations under the Controlled Foreign Corporation rules, reducing 
tax rates to decrease incentives for evasion, or adopting an international minimum tax). 
 36.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 37.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 38.  See Jesse Drucker, Yahoo, Dell Swell Netherlands’ $13 Trillion Tax Haven, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-23/yahoo-dell-swell-netherlands-13-
trillion-tax-haven.html. 
 39.  Drucker, Google, supra note 27 (“The earnings wind up in island havens that levy no 
corporate income taxes at all.”). 
 40.  WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 20, at 15. 
 41.  See WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 20, at 13–15; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
supra note 13, at 1. 
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means an exclusively American problem.  As Edward Kleinbard, former 
Chief of Staff of Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation, pointed out in 
referring to the “Double Irish” transaction: “This tax avoidance strategy used 
by Apple and other multinationals doesn’t just minimize the companies’ 
U.S. taxes . . . .  It’s German tax and French tax and tax in the U.K. and 
elsewhere.”42  Consequently, around the world, nations are under direct and 
indirect pressure to reform their corporate tax laws.43  Not only will this have 
an effect on U.S. tax laws and on the tax burdens of U.S. multinational 
corporations regardless of whether the U.S. actually decides to reform its 
own laws, it will have an effect on the success of corporate tax reform 
initiated in the U.S.44  This essay argues that any attempt to reform corporate 
taxation inevitably has to be undertaken as part of, or at least in light of, the 
already-existing global effort in this area—rather than operating purely as a 
domestic legislative matter. 
II.  THE GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM MOVEMENT 
Given the multinational nature of the corporate income tax problem, it is 
not surprising that the search for a solution has taken place on a 
multinational level.  In Europe, where the EU has used a variety of 
mechanisms at its disposal to force changes in the tax policies of its member 
states, this effort has been more top-down than collaborative.45  No treaty 
specifically provides the EU the authority to interfere with individual 
member states’ domestic corporate tax schemes, but a variety of directives 
have been advanced “to minimise corporate tax factors as an obstacle to 
doing business in the Single Market.”46  For example, prompted by the 
European Community Treaty’s guarantee of “free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital,” and the provision for nondiscrimination based 
on nationality,47 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) prohibited providing 
domestic individuals and products with more favorable tax treatment than 
foreign individuals and taxpayers.48  This same principle was applied in the 
 42.  Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-
states-and-nations.html?pagewanted=all. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See ALISTAIR CRAIG, EU LAW AND BRITISH TAX: WHICH COMES FIRST? (2003). 
 46.  CRAIG, supra note 45, at 11. 
 47.  Single European Act, arts. 12–13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. 
 48.  Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and 
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EU’s so-called “Parent/Subsidiary Directive,” which focused on outlawing 
the double taxation of dividends paid by a subsidiary of one member state to 
its parent company located in another member state.49  Indeed, the ECJ had 
“decided more than a hundred cases involving Member States’ income tax 
systems” as of 2007.50  As a result, Michael Graetz and Alvin Warren 
concluded that “the Court has become deeply enmeshed in fashioning the 
Member States’ income tax policies.”51 
The power of these multilateral efforts is evident in changes that have 
already occurred.  In large part, the United Kingdom’s 1997 and 1999 
reforms to the shareholder dividend credit under the imputation system were 
instigated by the growing influence of the ECJ.  The U.K. had systematically 
discriminated against foreign individuals through its imputation scheme and 
had institutionalized that arrangement as far back as the 1975 United 
Kingdom–United States Double Taxation Convention, in which it agreed to 
grant the shareholder credit to U.S. investors, less a fifteen percent deduction 
of the dividend and tax credit.52  Although no specific ruling addressed the 
U.K. system, government officials saw the writing on the wall.  Within a few 
years, in Verkooijen, the ECJ struck down a Dutch imputation arrangement 
similar to the one in place in the U.K.53  As Peter Harris and David Oliver 
observed, “it was the nail in the coffin of the standard European imputation 
system, which usually provided relief from economic double taxation of 
domestic dividends but not foreign dividends.”54 
Some have predicted that the ECJ’s formal intervention in member state 
corporate tax policies will ultimately lead to the development of a European 
corporate income tax.  In 2003, The Times reported that “Britain is losing 
control of its corporate tax base as tracts of company tax law are overturned 
by the European Court of Justice”55 and a study by the Centre for Policy 
Studies concluded that “Britain, and the other Member States of the EU, 
have lost effective control over how they set their corporation tax laws.”56  In 
subsequent years, the ECJ has continued to issue a number of rulings that 
Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1198–99 (2006). 
 49.  CRAIG, supra note 45, at 13. 
 50.  Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ 
Makes Tax Policy, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2007). 
 51.  Id. at 1578. 
 52.  Malcolm Gammie, UK Imputation, Past, Present and Future, 52 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 429, 433 (1998). 
 53.  Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. I-4071. 
 54.  PETER HARRIS & DAVID OLIVER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TAX 294 (2010). 
 55.  Gary Duncan, Chancellor Accused of Losing Control of Corporate Tax to EU, TIMES 
(London), Dec. 5, 2003, at 41. 
 56.  CRAIG, supra note 45, at i. 
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have resulted in changes or proposals for changes to British corporate tax 
policy, with little sign of a slowdown.57 
Beyond the ad hoc ECJ intrusions into the corporate tax policy of 
individual European nations, there have been a variety of direct efforts to 
more formally harmonize European corporate tax systems over the last forty 
years.58  Initially, those efforts were focused on rates.59  After a few attempts 
to directly legislate corporate tax harmonization, the European Commission 
issued a draft directive in 1970 proposing “closer alignment of corporate tax 
rates across the then Member States at levels between 45% and 55%.”60  A 
similar proposal was made in 1992 when the European Commission’s 
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation 
“recommended the harmonisation of corporate tax rates between 30% and 
40% across the EU.”61 
Although neither effort to harmonize rates was successful,62 the 
European Commission has promulgated a number of mechanisms, ostensibly 
designed to ensure that individual corporate tax systems do not interfere with 
the smooth functioning of the Single Market, but arguably operating to 
reduce much of the individual non-rate variation among the member states.63  
These included the Parent/Subsidiary Directive described above, the 
Mergers Directive,64 which helped facilitate mergers and reorganizations, 
and the Arbitration Procedure Convention, in which disputes over the 
taxation of profits earned by related companies in different member states 
were settled according to EU arbitration procedures.65  These measures are 
relatively modest intrusions on national sovereignty that were widely 
accepted as helpful to business, but indirectly they help push the member 
states closer to a common European corporate tax. 
A much more collaborative effort to institute a direct harmonization 
mechanism was afoot in the creation of the Code of Conduct on Business 
 57.  See, e.g., Gabriel Rozenberg, Corporate Tax Review Eyes Return of Pounds, TIMES 
(London), June 22, 2007, at 62 (describing proposed exemption of groups with foreign operations in 
countries with lower corporate tax rates from a separate dividend tax upon repatriation to Britain). 
 58.  Charles E. McLure, Jr., Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the European Community: 
Rationale and Implications, 22 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 151, 152 (2008). 
 59.  Id. at 153–54. 
 60.  CRAIG, supra note 45, at 12. 
 61.  Id. at 14. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Council Directive 90/434/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31990L0434:en:HTML. 
 65.  CRAIG, supra note 45, at 12–13. 
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Taxation in December of 1997.66  Through intensive and prolonged 
negotiations, the member states agreed to abolish or limit a number of 
harmful tax incentives or benefits offered by individual member states.  
Some have called this an example of the “Open Method of Coordination,” 
which involves the use of voluntary and non-binding guidelines as “a means 
of spreading best practice and achieving convergence towards the EU 
goals.”67 
Although the Code was a product of a more collaborative effort than 
individual ECJ decisions, individual nations still are concerned that it could 
expand to cover more controversial domestic tax issues than originally 
contemplated.68  A House of Lords Select Committee Report cited just this 
risk when it noted:  
We remain unclear about the implications for the United 
Kingdom of having agreed to this Code, in particular in relation to 
national sovereignty and to the principle of unanimity in tax 
matters. . . .  [T]here remains the risk that the process could lead to 
the UK being obliged—in practice if not in law—to adopt tax 
measures damaging to the interests of the economy or of citizens.69   
One particular concern, expressed by Conservative commentator Alistair 
Craig, is that the Code could interfere with a British government interested 
in cutting taxes in a way to induce investment, although there is no 
precedent for this in other countries.70 
The European Commission went one step further than the more 
voluntary Code when it proposed to create a “common consolidated 
corporate tax base” in Europe.71  The proposal emerged from concerns that 
multinational corporations could evade taxes by shifting profits to lower tax 
countries and countries are ill-equipped to combat this through transfer 
pricing conventions.72  The common consolidated corporate tax base would 
use a formulary apportionment system to allocate income from multinational 
corporations to member states based on the employees, payroll, sales, and/or 
assets in the jurisdiction.73  Such a system is already in place in the U.S. and 
 66.  See Harmful Tax Competition, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index_en.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013). 
 67.  Claudio M. Radaelli, The Code of Conduct Against Harmful Tax Competition: Open Method 
of Coordination in Disguise?, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 513, 513 (2003). 
 68.  CRAIG, supra note 45, at 15–16. 
 69.  SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TAXES IN THE EU: CAN CO-ORDINATION 
AND COMPETITION CO-EXIST?, 1998-99, H.L. 92, ¶ 19 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ldeucom/92/9203.htm. 
 70.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 71.  Leon Betterndorf et al., Corporate Tax Harmonization in the EU, 25 ECON. POL’Y 539, 540 
(2010). 
 72.  Id. at 539. 
 73.  Id. 
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Canada to deal with allocating corporate income among the various states 
and provinces, respectively.74  The problem, however, is agreeing upon a 
common corporate tax base for such a system, which would mean each 
member state would have to relinquish a measure of autonomy over the 
creation of its corporate tax provisions.  This also requires each member 
state to agree to such a base under the unanimity principle, which is difficult 
and has delayed the process considerably.  One British study warned that 
business “would face a higher tax burden, as part of the harmonisation of 
corporate business,” costing them as much as £4 billion per year.75  The 
Times advised that:  
If Britain really wants to resist a common tax policy, it would 
need to take an alternative initiative.  One might be to encourage 
EU tax experts to draw up unofficial model rules that evolve with 
time and that member states can use as a default where they have no 
different national priority.  Otherwise, the Commission’s siege 
engines will roll on.76 
The European Commission and the EU have used several of these 
mechanisms to pressure member states when their corporate tax systems 
deviate too substantially from the norm.  This is particularly evidenced by 
the experience with Ireland.  The country has a long experience with 
reducing its corporate tax rate in an attempt to attract foreign direct 
investment, dating back to the late 1950s.77  At one point, the country 
completely exempted from tax income from manufactured exports, but this 
was phased out starting in 1978 and ultimately replaced in 1980 with a 10% 
rate for the manufacturing industry.78  This special rate was later extended to 
cover activities at the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin and 
in a tax-free zone surrounding Shannon airport, but the prevailing rate for 
companies not covered by any of those exceptions remained at 32%.79  
Eventually, this special rate came under scrutiny by the European 
Commission, which pressured Ireland to raise it to a rate “much closer to the 
 74.  Id. at 540. 
 75.  Elizabeth Judge, Single European Tax Could Cost UK Business £4bn, Academics Warn, 
TIMES (London), May 3, 2007, at 55. 
 76.  Graham Searjeant, EU Has Company Tax in Its Sights, TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2005, at 
61. 
 77.  Barry, supra note 26, at 223. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id.; Sheila Killian, Where’s the Harm in Tax Competition? Lessons from US Multinationals 
in Ireland, 17 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACC’T 1067, 1075 (2006). 
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EU average.”80  Moreover, the EU alleged that the disparate treatment of 
domestic and foreign manufacturers violated the Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation and the OECD’s “Guidelines on Harmful Preferential Tax 
Regimes.”81  In response to this EU pressure, both on the level of its rates 
and on its non-uniform application, Ireland eventually agreed in 1998 to 
raise its manufacturing rate to 12.5% and to extend for all corporations, 
effective starting in 2003.82  The 2010 EU bailout of the Irish government 
led to renewed calls for an increase in Ireland’s corporate tax rate.83  While 
that has not happened, EU rules have thus far stymied efforts by Northern 
Ireland to secure the right to reduce its corporate tax rate to 12.5% as well.84 
More recently, there has been a push for more cooperative efforts to 
address the global problem of corporate tax evasion exemplified in the 
“Double Irish” or “Dutch Sandwich” transaction described earlier.85  In 
November of 2012, the OECD announced a project to “prevent base erosion 
and profit shifting.”86  According to the OECD briefing on this project: 
Domestic rules for international taxation and internationally agreed 
standards are still grounded in an economic environment 
characterised by a lower degree of economic integration across 
borders, rather than today’s environment of global taxpayers, 
characterised by the increasing importance of intellectual property 
as a value-driver and by constant developments of information and 
communication technologies.  For example, some rules and their 
underlying policy were built on the assumption that one country 
would forgo taxation because another country would be imposing 
tax.  In the modern global economy, this assumption is not always 
correct, as planning opportunities may result in profits ending up 
untaxed anywhere.87 
 80.  Barry, supra note 26, at 223. 
 81.  Killian, supra note 79, at 1075. 
 82.  Barry, supra note 26, at 223. 
 83.  Paul Taylor, Analysis: Ireland’s Corporate Tax in Dispute in EU Rescue, REUTERS (Nov. 
19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AI3HN20101119. 
 84.  Jamie Smyth, Treasury Resists N Ireland Corporation Tax Cuts Plan, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(London), June 25, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d5f38d8-bee0-11e1-bebe-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NkpZ9tff (“Under European Union rules any reduction in corporation tax 
in Northern Ireland would have to be accompanied by a reduction in the block grant from 
Westminster.  The Treasury currently predicts the costs of a tax cut to the block grant could reach 
£500m.”). 
 85.  See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text. 
 86.  See Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013) (quoting G20 Leaders Declaration of 
June 19, 2012). 
 87.  OECD, THE OECD WORK ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 1 (2013),  available at 
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The OECD identified several “key pressure areas” that created an 
environment in which corporate base erosion flourished: 
• International mismatches in entity and instrument characterisation 
including hybrid mismatch arrangements and arbitrage; 
• application of treaty concepts to profits derived from the delivery 
of digital goods and services; 
• the tax treatment of related party debt-financing, captive insurance 
and other inter-group financial transactions; 
• transfer pricing, in particular in relation to the shifting of risks and 
intangibles, the artificial splitting of ownership of assets between 
legal entities within a group, and transactions between such entities 
that would rarely take place between independents; 
• the effectiveness of anti-avoidance measures, in particular 
GAARs, CFC regimes and thin capitalisation rules; and 
• the availability of preferential regimes for certain activities.88 
The OECD recommended coordinated efforts to alleviate the divergent 
domestic rules and regulations that contributed to this base-erosion 
environment.89 
Motivated by similar concerns, the European Commission introduced a 
plan in December of 2012 “to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax 
evasion.”90  A Communication from the European Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council proposed a variety of specific measures, 
including recommendations that member states adopt minimum standards 
for good governance in tax matters that they could directly and indirectly 
pressure third-party nations to adopt.91  It also proposed adopting a “common 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/TheOECDworkonBEPS.pdf. 
 88.  Id. at 2. 
 89.  Id. at 2–3. 
 90.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 1, 
COM (2012) 722 final (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/ 
resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/com_2012_722_en.pdf. 
 91.  Id. at 6. 
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general anti-abuse rule” that it could encourage or require member states to 
include in all bilateral treaties.92 
III.  THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM 
Although the U.S. is not subject to the jurisdiction of many of these 
international or regional groups, the European Commission’s above-
described proposals to push for the adoption of its standards by third parties 
reveals one mechanism by which the U.S. and other non-member states 
could be influenced directly by global corporate tax reform.  It would not be 
unprecedented for the U.S. system of business taxation to arouse the scrutiny 
and displeasure of international groups.  An example of this is the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) intervention regarding the U.S.’s 
extraterritorial income exclusion and foreign sales corporation provisions.93  
The foreign sales corporation provision, which was enacted in 1984, 
exempted from U.S. tax part of the income earned from products sold abroad 
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturers.94  These provisions were 
enacted to resolve a prior dispute under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) regarding the EU’s protest of the U.S.’ domestic 
international sales corporation provisions.95  A little over a decade later, the 
EU levied a similar challenge against the foreign sales corporation before a 
dispute resolution panel of the successor to GATT, the WTO, and the WTO 
upheld the challenge.96  To respond to this ruling, the U.S. enacted the FSC 
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act in 2000.97  Adopting the 
extraterritorial income exclusion as a replacement for the foreign sales 
corporation, this provision applied to all sales and leases by foreign 
subsidiaries, regardless of where the products were manufactured, so long as 
the manufacturer agreed to be subject to the taxing authority of the U.S.98  
The EU challenged this again in 2001 as an illegal export subsidy, leading 
the WTO rule against the U.S.99  After a protracted battle, the U.S. repealed 
the exclusion of income for exporters and adopted a deduction for domestic 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  For more description of the background of these provisions and the WTO and preceding 
interventions, see Hearing on the WTO’s Extraterritorial Income Decision Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/fullcomm/107cong/2-27-
02/2-27angu.htm [hereinafter Testimony of Barbara Angus]; Charles I. Kingson, The Great 
American Jobs Act Caper, 58 TAX L. REV. 327, 329–31 (2005). 
 94.  Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 93. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:13 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1307, 2013]  Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1321 
manufacturers under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.100  As 
“compensation” for the loss of the export subsidy, Congress “slightly 
reduced the corporate tax rate on all goods manufactured in the United 
States.”101 
More directly, the U.S. may be pressured to collaborate in reform efforts 
through its membership in the Group of Eight, or the “G8.”  British Prime 
Minister David Cameron announced that he was going to use his presidency 
of the G8 in 2013 to “drive a more serious debate” on corporate tax evasion 
by multinational firms.102  Cameron signaled that this would be a multilateral 
effort among G8 member states: “In the UK we’ve already committed 
hundreds of millions into this effort—but acting alone has its limits.  Clamp 
down in one country and the travelling caravan of lawyers, accountants and 
financial gurus just moves on elsewhere.  We need to act together at the 
G8.”103 
Even outside of the formal involvement of international trade 
organizations, there is evidence that global corporate tax reform is 
increasingly pressuring countries to reform their corporate tax systems.  This 
is most apparent in the pressure to reduce corporate tax rates.  Although the 
U.K. corporate tax rate had dropped two percentage points as part of the late 
1990s reforms, there was soon agitation to lower it even further.  In 2006, 
the British Chambers of Commerce cited the fact that the U.K.’s corporate 
tax rate, which was once the ninth lowest among OECD countries, had 
dropped to the sixteenth lowest, claiming that “[o]ur current rate threatens to 
harm business competitiveness.”104  The British Institute of Directors “called 
for the main rate of corporation tax to be cut to 28 per cent,” noting that “[i]f 
we are to remain competitive, we must act now,”105 while the Confederation 
of British Industries (CBI) claimed that “the present corporation tax rate was 
‘unsustainable’ because it was much higher than those of European 
competitors” and that “[a] trickle of companies is relocating and our worry is 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Kingson, supra note 93, at 330. 
 102.  Mark Thompson, UK to Tax Cheats: ‘Wake Up and Smell the Coffee’, CNN MONEY (Jan. 
24, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/24/news/economy/cameron-tax-trade/. 
 103.  Larry Elliott & Heather Stewart, David Cameron Makes Swipe at Starbucks as He Promises 
Focus on Tax, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/ 
jan/24/david-cameron-starbucks-focus-tax. 
 104.  Gary Duncan, Chancellor Told to Cut Corporation Tax, TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 2006, at 
56. 
 105.  Id. 
08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:13 AM 
 
1322 
that it might turn into a flood.”106  Even after the rate was cut to 28%, the 
CBI pushed for an additional drop in rates to 18% by 2016.107  With the 
change to a Conservative government in 2010, new Chancellor George 
Osborne already reduced the corporate tax rate to 24% as of April 2012 and 
has announced plans to reduce it to 22% percent in 2014.108  This would be 
the lowest rate since 1965.109 
Not only has the nominal U.K. corporate tax rate declined in recent 
years, but the effective rate has dropped as well.  In October 2010, the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) released a report describing several 
“worrying trends,”110 including a decline in the corporate effective tax rate 
from just below 28% in 2000 when the statutory rate was 30% to 23% in 
2009 when the statutory rate had only dropped to 28%.111  Based upon the 
expectation that the statutory rate would drop from 28% to 24% by 2015, the 
TUC predicted that large companies would pay an effective corporate tax 
rate of only 17% by 2014, which would be lower than the rate paid by small 
companies and the majority of U.K. households.112  With both the pace and 
the amount of rate reduction accelerating since the TUC report was released, 
the effective rate will drop even further.  According to the TUC, this will 
mean that for the first time there will be “a regressive UK corporation tax 
system.”113 
The competitive pressure to harmonize corporate tax rates extends well 
beyond Europe to include both the U.S. and Japan.  Up until recently, these 
two countries had the highest corporate tax rate among OECD countries, 
with the U.S.’s combined federal and state effective rate of 39.2% placing it 
13.7 percentage points ahead of the OECD average.114  Japan’s effective 
corporate tax rate of 41% was even higher than the American rate, 
reportedly contributing to the departure of many Japanese manufacturing 
 106.  Christine Buckley, Cut Tax or Lose More Business, Says CBI, TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 
2006, at 52. 
 107.  Christine Buckley, Employers and Unions Lobby Over Corporate Tax Rate and Non Doms, 
TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 2008, at 44. 
 108.  Svenja O’Donnell, Osborne Cuts U.K. Corporation Tax Rate to 24% From April, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-21/osborne-cuts-u-k-
corporation-tax-rate-to-24-from-april.html; Budget 2012: Mixed Business Reaction to Budget, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17460262. 
 109.  Suzy Jagger, Corporate Tax Will Be the Lowest in G20, Osborne Promises CBI, TIMES 
(London), May 20, 2010, at 39. 
 110.  RICHARD MURPHY, TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THE CORPORATE TAX GAP 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.tuc.org.uk/extras/corporatetaxgap.pdf. 
 111.  Id. at 12. 
 112.  Id. at 13–14. 
 113.  Id. at 14. 
 114.  Peter R. Merrill, Corporate Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 623, 624 
(2010). 
08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:13 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1307, 2013]  Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1323 
corporations to lower tax jurisdictions.115  The gap between these two 
countries and the rest of the pack has widened with rate reductions in 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and twenty-five other developed nations since 
2001.116  In just the last two years alone, countries such as Canada, Finland, 
Greece, India, New Zealand, and Slovenia have enacted corporate rate cuts, 
and other countries such as Sweden are considering similar cuts in 
response.117 
To counter such corporate tax rate cuts and increase the general 
competitiveness of business, the Japanese government announced plans in 
late 2010 to reduce its corporate tax rate by five percentage points.118  
Concern about growing revenue needs after the 2011 tsunami and ensuing 
nuclear reactor issues delayed this plan, but it was revived and enacted in 
2012.119  Although the rate reduction was not as momentous as it first 
appeared because of a three-year “Special Reconstruction Corporation 
Surtax” aimed at helping the country rebuild after the tsunami, it still 
reduced the statutory rate to approximately 38% until 2015, when it drops to 
35.64%.120  Moreover, given the reduction of South Korea’s main corporate 
tax rate to 20% in 2012,121 the pressure will continue for further rate cuts in 
Japan. 
Japan’s move could accelerate the already-existing efforts to reduce 
corporate tax rates in the U.S.  The effective tax rates for American 
corporations are much lower than the combined federal–state statutory rate, 
but it was still estimated to be 27.9% in 2009, which was then the third 
 115.  Japanese Manufacturers: Leaving Home, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17527225. 
 116.  We’re Number One, Alas, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2007), at A12, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118428874152665452.html. 
 117.  KATARZYNA BILICKA & MICHAEL DEVEREUX, CBT CORPORATE TAX RANKING 2012, at 16, 
tbl. 4 (2012); Johan Nylander, Sweden Plans to Cut Corporate Tax, THE SWEDISH WIRE (June 5, 
2012), http://www.swedishwire.com/economy/14043-sweden-plans-to-cut-corporate-tax. 
 118.  Hiroko Tabuchi, Its Recovery Sputtering, Japan Will Cut Corporate Income Tax Rate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2010, at B4. 
 119.  Richard Rubin, Japan’s Rate Drop Puts U.S. at Top of Corporate Tax Rankings, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-04-02/japan-s-rate-drop-
puts-u-s-at-top-of-corporate-tax-rankings.html. 
 120.  Taichi Haraguchi, Japan’s Corporate Tax Rate Cut: Given With One Hand, Taken Away 
with the Other?, 2012 TAX POL’Y & CONTROVERSY BRIEFING 1, 84, available at 
http://tmagazine.ey.com/insights/japans-corporate-tax-rate-cut-given-with-one-hand-taken-away-
with-the-other/. 
 121.  BILICKA & DEVEREUX, supra note 117, at 16; Cho Jin-seo, Tax Cut Initiative to Reveal 
MB’s True Colors, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/n 
ews/biz/2011/04/123_76454.html. 
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highest among OECD countries.122  A more recent estimate set the effective 
average tax rate at 34.9% and the effective marginal tax rate at 23.3%, 
which, when combined with Japan’s 2012 reform, leaves the U.S. with the 
highest average rates among OECD countries.123  Although the differential 
with the effective rates of other OECD nations is still considered to be 
reasonably small,124 a number of U.S. government reports have been released 
that have highlighted this problem.125  During the 2012 election campaign, 
President Barack Obama proposed lowering the corporate tax rate to 28%, 
albeit as part of a broader reform that would eliminate some deductions and 
broaden the corporate tax base.126  Given a competing proposal from 
Republican candidate Mitt Romney to lower the rate to 25%, the 
Washington Post described it as “one of the few areas of real common 
ground in American tax policy.”127 
Even if the global pressure does not result in U.S. corporate tax reform, 
the changes in corporate tax laws in other countries and regions have a direct 
impact on U.S. multinational firms doing business in those countries.  Manal 
Corwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs, speaking 
about the OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting project, recently opined 
that “[w]hether tax reform [in the U.S.] will or will not happen, and when it 
will happen if it does happen, in some ways becomes less relevant because 
things are already happening at the OECD that are going to affect U.S. 
multinationals.”128 
The chance for individual firms to exit a given tax scheme will continue 
to shrink as the effective corporate tax rates of the industrialized world 
converge, and as alternate forms of corporate structure remain unavailable to 
 122.  Merrill, supra note 114, at 624. 
 123.  BILICKA & DEVEREUX, supra note 117, at 14, tbl. 3; US Displacing Japan as No 1 for 
Highest Corp Taxes, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/assets/ 
print?aid=USL2E8EU5VV20120330. 
 124.  JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34229, 
CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 (2007). 
 125. Id. at 1–35; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISONS (Nov. 2005); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS 
TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007); John D. McKinnon, Obama: Corporate Tax 
Rate Cut Could Be “Win–Win”, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/10/04/obama-corporate-tax-rate-cut-could-be-win-win/. 
 126.  Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Proposes Lowering Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 21, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-to-propose-
lowering-corporate-tax-rate-to-28-percent/2012/02/22/gIQA1sjdSR_story.html. 
 127.  Dylan Matthews, Everyone Wants to Lower Corporate Tax Rates. Here’s How You Do It., 
WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2012/09/26/everyone-wants-to-lower-corporate-tax-rates-heres-how-you-do-it/. 
 128.  Treasury Official: U.S. Tax Reform Efforts Must Be Informed by International Fight Against 
Base Erosion, ITPF, (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.itpf.org/itpf_blog?article_id=18 (quoting Manal 
Corwin, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs). 
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certain firms and in certain industries.129  Economists Jane Gravelle and 
Thomas Hungerford, in a congressional report expanding on the work of 
UCLA Professor Arnold Harbarger, concluded that “as long as countries 
tend to choose tax rates similar to each other, which appears to be the case, 
the world becomes like the original closed economy.”130  Although a truly 
closed global economy might bring much needed stability to international 
corporate rates, individual nations could find it difficult to use the corporate 
tax in satisfying their particular domestic needs.131 
IV.  CONNECTING GLOBAL REFORM WITH U.S. INITIATIVES 
Given the formal and informal pressures toward convergence of national 
corporate tax systems and rates, the notion that corporate tax reform in the 
United States can proceed in a purely unilateral fashion seems increasingly 
unlikely.  Indeed, as the OECD points out, while the business community 
has been vocal throughout the last century about the need for bilateral or 
multilateral efforts to avoid double taxation, they have been noticeably quiet 
on the subject of such cooperative efforts in the context of reining in 
corporate profits shifting and tax evasion.132  This may be because they know 
that any unilateral efforts may be thwarted to the extent that they create 
further distinctions between U.S. and global law that companies can 
leverage for their own benefit.  According to the OECD, part of the problem 
is that “corporations often exploit differences in domestic tax rules and 
international standards that provide opportunities to eliminate or 
significantly reduce taxation.”133  As a result, the OECD concludes a 
collaborative global effort is critical: 
[I]t may be impossible for any single country, acting alone, to fully 
address the issue. . . .  Failure to collaborate in addressing BEPS 
[base erosion and profit shifting] issues could result in unilateral 
actions that would risk undermining the consensus-based 
framework for establishing jurisdiction to tax and addressing double 
taxation which exists today.  The consequences could be damaging 
in terms of increased possibilities for mismatches, additional 
 129.  See BANK, supra note 1, at 264. 
 130.  GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 124, at 15; see BANK, supra note 1, at 264. 
 131.  See BANK, supra note 1, at 264. 
 132.  OECD, supra note 87, at 1–2. 
 133.  Id. at 2. 
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disputes, increased uncertainty for business, a battle to be the first to 
grab taxable income through purported anti-avoidance measures, or 
a race to the bottom with respect to corporate income taxes.  In 
contrast, collaboration to address BEPS concerns will enhance and 
support individual governments’ domestic policy efforts to protect 
their tax base while protecting multinationals from uncertainty or 
double taxation.134 
The European Commission has sounded a similar message, concluding 
that “[t]ax fraud and tax evasion is a multi-facetted [sic] problem which 
requires a coordinated and multi-pronged response.  Aggressive tax planning 
is also a problem which requires urgent attention.  These are global 
challenges which no single Member State can face alone.”135 
 Tax officials have already embraced multilateralism in the context of 
enforcement efforts.  As one commentator observes, “[g]iven that the big 
four accounting firms also operate world-wide, and tax administrations do 
not, the latter have worked to seek out and share ‘best practice,’ often 
accomplished with the assistance of international agencies such as the 
OECD, IMF and World Bank.”136  The European Commission has pushed to 
encourage and formalize such cooperation, noting: “Tax fraud and tax 
evasion have an important cross-border dimension.  Member States can only 
address this problem effectively if they work together.  Improving 
administrative cooperation between Member States’ tax administrations is 
therefore a key objective of the Commission’s strategy in this area.”137 
This paper should not be construed as stating a normative case either for 
international cooperation or against acting in a country’s self-interest at the 
expense of other countries.138  It does not mean that individual nations 
should not act domestically.  Indeed, many of the tax reform proposals in 
Europe and elsewhere contemplate domestic action and acknowledge the 
continued existence of legitimate differences in domestic policies on 
particular issues.139  Nevertheless, to be successful, any attempt at domestic 
corporate tax reform must be informed by and in some respects reflect 
 134.  Id. at 3. 
 135.  See Communication from the Commission, supra note 90, at 15. 
 136.  John Hasseldine et al., Companies and Taxes in the UK: Actors, Actions, Consequences and 
Responses, 10 ATAX EJOURNAL OF TAX RES. 532, 535 (2012). 
 137.  Communication from the Commission, supra note 90, at 3. 
 138.  For a discussion of such issues, see Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign: 
Advice for the Second Obama Administration, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (2013); Peggy B. Musgrave, 
Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 
1336 (2001). 
 139.  Cf. Omri Y. Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the 
United States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 173–82 (2012) (noting that local differences may make it 
difficult to compare tax reforms in seemingly similar countries). 
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international standards and developments in the global corporate tax reform 
movement. 
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